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The Gettysburg Campaign
CAROL REARDON

The Battle of Gettysburg has inspired a more voluminous literature than any
single event in American military history for at least three major reasons.
First, after three days of fighting on July 1-3, 1863, General Robert E. Lee's
Confederate Army of Northern Virginia and Major General George
G. Meade’s Army of the Potomac lost more than 51,000 dead, wounded,
captured, and missing, making Gettysburg the costliest military engagement
in North American history. Second, President Abraham Lincoln endowed
Gettysburg with special distinction when he visited in November 1863 to
dedicate the soldiers’ cemetery and delivered his immortal Gettysburg
Address. Finally, Gettysburg gave the Union its first significant victory over
General Lee; the subsequent euphoria helped to fix in popular memory - if
not in objective history - an enduring image of Gettysburg as the turning
point of the Civil War.

12.1 The Confederacy’s Strategic Challenges in
mid-1863
In the late spring of 1863, the Confederacy faced a deteriorating strategic
environment. Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant’s Union forces had
surrounded Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton’s Confederate army
at Vicksburg, a key Mississippi River port, and General Joseph E.
Johnston’s relief force had proven unable to raise the siege; substantial
Union ground and naval forces probed General P. G. T. Beauregard’s
Confederate troops around Charleston, South Carolina; Major General
William S. Rosecrans’s Union army challenged Confederate general
Braxton Bragg in middle and eastern Tennessee; and Union forces near
Suffolk, Virginia threatened Richmond itself. General Lee watched these
developments closely and in April advised Confederate secretary of war
James A. Seddon that "the readiest method of relieving pressure on
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General Johnston and General Beauregard would be for this army to cross
into Maryland” and head north.12
Lee also faced dire challenges of his own, especially a serious shortage of
for his army and its animals. He could not tap into large parts of the
Shenandoah Valley, the heart of Virginia’s agricultural production, now under
Union military occupation. Two years of war had devastated farms in Virginia’s
Tidewater and Piedmont, as well. By mid-April, Lee wrote his wife that he
needed to “establish our supplies on a firm basis,” and opportunity beckoned
after Lee defeated the Army of the Potomac under Major General Joseph
Hooker at Chancellorsville on May 1-3, 1863? Despite the loss of 13,000 men
and the death of Lieutenant General Thomas J. "Stonewall” Jackson, Lee
informed his civilian superiors that the time had come for a northward advance
by his army to sweep Union troops from the Shenandoah Valley, to push the
Army of the Potomac out of Virginia, and to give the state’s farmers a chance
to plant and harvest a crop. Additionally, he argued, the disruption caused by
such a campaign would afford “greater relief’ to the Confederate “armies in
middle Tennessee and on the Carolina coast than by any other method.”3
Brief snippets in postwar memoirs suggest that Lee’s plan did not win the
immediate support of the Confederacy's senior military and political leaders,
and other alternatives - including sending Lee himself or parts of his army to
the western theater - received active consideration before President Davis
finally gave the nod to Lee’s offensive into Union territory. No detailed minutes
survive to explain or prioritize the factors that shaped the discussions, however,
and since Lee started his summer offensive with no public announcement from
the Davis administration, the public press speculated extensively about the
goals of the campaign. Credible suppositions - including Lee’s desire to
improve his logistical base and take active operations onto Northern soil blended with grandiose claims for designs to capture Washington, to forge
formal alliances with European powers, to force Grant to lift the siege at
Vicksburg and redeploy his troops against Lee, or even to force Lincoln to
surrender by completely destroying the Army of the Potomac on northern soil.
The lack of clear specifics for Lee’s campaign extended to his plans for his
army’s goals in Pennsylvania. After reorganizing his army followingjackson’s
death from two corps into three - under his second-in-command, Lieutenant
General James Longstreet, and newly promoted lieutenant generals Richard
1 Clifford Dowdey and Louis Manarin (eds.), The Wartime Papers of Robert E. Lee
(New York: Bramhall House, 1961), p. 430.
2 Dowdey and Manarin (eds.), Wartime Papers, p. 438.
3 Dowdey and Manarin (eds.), Wartime Papers, pp. 434-5.
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S. Ewell and A. P. Hill - he ordered his army northward on June 3. Lee •
no formal commander’s intent to inform the actions of his senior sub^jJ
nates. Nor did he make a public announcement to Pennsylvanians to e
his army’s presence as he had done during the Maryland campaign in
One major criticism of Lee’s generalship in the summer of 1863 centers on bi.
failure to send his 75,000-man army into Pennsylvania with a clearly defin
mission. Lee left behind an evidentiary void that authors of Gettysbu
campaign narratives have filled with both reasonable assumptions about hf

logistical concerns and more dubious notions such as his intention to capture
eastern Pennsylvania’s anthracite coal fields.4

12.2 The Union Reaction to Lee’s Move North
General Hooker missed Lee’s initial northward moves, but his horsemen
caught Major General James E. B. Stuart’s Confederate cavalry off guard near
Brandy Station, Virginia on June 9, and sent them reeling. The setback did not
deter Lee. He continued to push toward the Shenandoah Valley for the
protection of the Blue Ridge Mountains. On June 14-15, Ewell’s 2nd Corps
at the head of Lee’s advance routed the Union garrison at Winchester. Ewell
entered Pennsylvania on June 22, and his men gathered supplies so aggres
sively that Lee issued two special orders to chastise his men for their
"instances of forgetfulness.”5 For the next week, Confederate troops contin
ued to fill their logistical needs, reached the outskirts of Harrisburg, and easily
repulsed challenges from Pennsylvania’s Emergency Militia. Hooker initially
considered a thrust toward the Confederate capital, but Lincoln reminded
him sternly that "Lee’s army and not Richmond, is your sure objective
point.”6 Hooker began his belated pursuit by sending his cavalry against
the tail of Lee's army still in Virginia, but at Middleburg, Upperville, and
Aldie, Stuart's Confederate horsemen effectively blocked them.
By June 27, with Lee already in Pennsylvania, Hooker had finally entered
Maryland. Under War Department pressure to pursue more aggressively,
Hooker sent a sharply worded dispatch demanding reinforcements and expan
sion of his authority. Early on June 28, Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton
4 See Army and Navy Journal, vol. 1, October 10, 1863.
5 For the text of Special Orders Nos. 72 and 73, see United States War Department, The War
of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 127
vols., index, and atlas (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901),
specifically series I, volume 27, part 3, pp. 912-13 and 942-3 (hereafter cited as OR; all
subsequent citations are of series 1 unless otherwise noted).
6 OR, 27(1): 35.
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J Hooker of command of the Army of the Potomac and replaced him
^'^ajor General George G. Meade. The order also provided Meade with
***“ fing wo-part mission; he had to protect Washington and Baltimore, as
3 * gjjj and fight Lee. With incomplete knowledge of the deployment of
W
ano men in his seven-infantry corps and cavalry - and even less
“ nation on Lee’s troops - he nonetheless issued orders to resume the
ch toward Pennsylvania the day following his promotion. Selective reading
°f Meade’s initial orders enabled detractors to describe his contingency plan for
defensive stand along Pipe Creek on the Maryland border as evidence of his
] ck of aggressiveness; but Meade understood both his offensive and defensive
fissions and expressed clear willingness to “assume the offensive from this
place” should opportunity offer.78
On June 30, Meade sent Brigadier General John Buford’s 2,800-man cavalry
division to Gettysburg to find and report back on Lee’s movements. Buford's
troopers fanned out to the north, east, and west along seven of the ten roads
that converged in this crossroads town. They reported a strong Confederate
presence north and west of town and exchanged shots with reconnoitering
Confederate infantry along the Chambersburg Road west of town. Buford
correctly predicted to Meade that a fight would start near Gettysburg the next
morning.

12.3 July 1: The Battle Begins
When Lee heard of Meade's promotion, the Army of Northern Virginia
stretched from the Maryland border near Hagerstown north to
Chambersburg and then east to the outskirts of Harrisburg. Lee lacked
reliable information about the Army of the Potomac’s activities and inten
tions. Because Stuart had interpreted Lee’s June 23 orders to "take position on
the right [east] of our column” to justify a wide-ranging swing to the east of
the entire Union army as well - a decision still hotly debated by students of
the battle today - he had not kept Lee reliably updated on Meade’s
movements? Thus, Lee prudently ordered his overstretched army to con
centrate near Cashtown, Pennsylvania, about 8 miles northwest of
Gettysburg. His corps commanders knew not to bring on a fight until the
entire force had arrived.
7 George Gordon Meade (ed.), The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Major General,
United States Army, 2 vols. (1913; reprint edition, Baltimore, MD: Butternut and Blue,
1994), vol. 11, p. 11.
8 OR, 27(2): 316.

227

CAROL REARDON

Brigadier General Henry Heth’s division from A. P. Hill’s 3rd Corps k I
probed toward Gettysburg on June 30 and engaged with Buford’s tro
1
mistaking them for local militia. Early on July 1, they advanced again do ’
the Chambersburg Road and once again met Buford’s men, this time
Marsh Creek, approximately 3 miles west of Gettysburg. A brief exchange^
shots here started the Battle of Gettysburg at approximately 7:00 a.m
The terrain west of Gettysburg rolled across a series of gentle ridges ideal
for defense. On McPherson’s Ridge, 1 mile west of town, Buford established
the line he determined to hold and sent back a constant stream of information
to update Major General Meade and Major General John F. Reynolds
commanding the I Corps, the closest Union reinforcements. On Seminary
Ridge, the final height between McPherson’s Ridge and Gettysburg, Buford
used the cupola of the Pennsylvania Lutheran Seminary's Old Dorm to
observe Heth’s advance and the measured withdrawal of his troopers to
McPherson’s Ridge. As pressure grew on the outnumbered cavalrymen Heth had put two full infantry brigades into his first line - Reynolds finally
reached the battlefield and took charge of the fight. His arrival changed the
asymmetric infantry-versus-cavalry meeting engagement of the early morn
ing to a more conventional and sustained infantry clash. Even if Heth had not
sought a fight, he now faced one.
Reynolds had no time to plan a battle. He simply responded to the threat in
his front and tried to stop Heth. About 10:45, while ordering his famous Iron
Brigade against the Tennesseans and Alabamians pouring into a woodlot on
McPherson’s Ridge, Reynolds fell dead, shot through the head. Major
General Abner Doubleday, the I Corps’ senior division commander, suc
ceeded to command with little knowledge of the situation or Reynolds's
intentions. The Iron Brigade cleared the woods and bought Doubleday time
to consider his options - attack, withdraw, or hold on - while other I Corps
troops stopped a brigade of Mississippians and North Carolinians in the bed of
an unfinished railroad on the north side of the Chambersburg Road, captur
ing several hundred Confederates. Noon brought a brief calm for Doubleday
and Heth to decide their next moves; both determined to continue the fight
for McPherson’s Ridge.
The sudden arrival around noon of substantial Confederate reinforce
ments broke the quiet. Major General Robert E. Rodes’s division from
Ewell’s 2nd Corps had planned to rejoin Lee near Cashtown, but the sounds
of Heth’s fight against the Union I Corps drew them instead toward
Gettysburg. As they emerged from the woods on Oak Hill, a height just
north of McPherson’s Ridge, the two generals realized they held a seemingly
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& pOSition to envelop the right flank of Doubleday’s I Corps. Ewell,
pr still operating under orders not to engage until the army concen®
faced an interesting choice: obey his original instructions, or take
^vantage of a promising opportunity to attack.
“
t Ewell turned Oak Hill into a formidable artillery platform. Then, he
dered Rodes to assault the right flank of the I Corps line, which, he
believed, rested in a woodlot on a slight ridge extending south from Oak
plill now designated Oak Ridge. Rodes planned a coordinated attack of three
brigades, with Colonel Edward A. O’Neal’s Alabamians on the left, Brigadier
general Alfred Iverson’s North Carolina brigade in the center, and Brigadier
Junius Daniel’s North Carolinians on the right.
The plan seemed reasonable and straightforward, but it fell apart from
series of inexplicable errors. O’Neal’s Alabamians attacked first and alone.
They attacked through low ground behind Oak Ridge, expecting little
resistance. When they found an entire I Corps brigade in a line of battle
blocking them and then spotted the head of Major General Oliver
0 Howard’s newly arrived XI Corps entering the fields north of
Gettysburg and threatening their left flank, the Alabamians fired a few volleys
and withdrew. O’Neal failed to report these unanticipated developments to
Rodes or Ewell, and Iverson and Daniel advanced still believing they aimed at
an unprotected Union flank. Unfortunately for Iverson’s men, the Union
troops who repulsed O’Neal redeployed behind the crest of Oak Ridge and
caught the Tar Heels in close-range volleys. Nearly half of them fell dead or
wounded within fifteen minutes, and Iverson, who had remained on Oak
Hill, refused to ride forward to rally the survivors. Daniel’s brigade could not
succor them either. Instead of advancing westward, they unaccountably
veered south, away from Oak Ridge and toward the railroad cut and the
Chambersburg Pike. This costly episode - as with the debacle at the railroad
cut - demonstrated that overall Confederate success could also include
individual and small-unit failures.9
The arrival of Howard’s XI Corps certainly complicated Ewell’s decisions,
but it also gave the Union forces at Gettysburg its fourth different comman
der on July i. He astutely left Brigadier General Adolph von Steinwehr’s
division on Cemetery Hill, a prominent treeless elevation on the southern
edge of Gettysburg, to establish a strong defensive position to serve, if

'

Per

9 Robert K. Krick, "Three Confederate Disasters on Oak Ridge: Failures of Brigade
Leadership on the First Day at Gettysburg,” in Gary W. Gallagher (ed.), The First Day
at Gettysburg: Essays on Confederate and Union Leadership (Kent, OH: Kent State University
Press, 1992). pp. 92-140.
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needed, as a rallying point. Howard then ordered Doubleday to cont' J
holding the I Corps line west of Gettysburg on McPherson’s Ridge He th16
turned his attention to Ewell’s approach from the north. While Rodes’
s ITlpn
pressed their attacks from Oak Hill northwest of town, Howard learned k **
Major General Jubal Early’s division under Ewell’s corps had begun to dep| '
battle lines astride the Harrisburg Road northeast of Gettysburg. How i
quickly ordered his remaining two divisions under Major General Qa ]
Schurz and Brigadier General Francis C. Barlow to positions north of th
town to stop Ewell. Both division commanders were military amateurs and
their dispositions showed it. Schurz failed to close a gap between his left flank
and the right flank of the I Corps, and the strength of the two XI Corps
divisions combined proved insufficient to cover the front assigned to them
Barlow created an additional gap between his division and Schurz by advan
cing against orders to take possession of a knob of high ground in his front
As Howard completed his dispositions, General Lee reached the battle
field. From his position west of Gettysburg, he could not see Howard and
Ewell’s lines north of Gettysburg, but he had received enough positive news
to abandon his intention to concentrate his army before accepting battle
At mid-afternoon, Lee ordered an attack along his entire line, from northeast
to northwest to west.
When Early launched his assault on Barlow’s division northeast of
Gettysburg, the troops on the right flank of the XI Corps line were unpre
pared to receive the attack. Barlow fell badly wounded and many of his
soldiers broke for the rear, significant numbers of them captured in the
unfamiliar streets of Gettysburg. Northern newspapers of the day blamed
the entire XI Corps - not just Barlow’s division - for repeating their collapse
at Chancellorsville, when they crumbled under Stonewall Jackson’s flank
attack. Once again, the press labeled them as "Howard’s Cowards,” the
“Flying Half-moons” from their crescent-shaped corps badge, or, in reference
to the significant number of German-bom soldiers in its ranks, the “Flying
Dutchmen.”10 But the entire XI Corps did not deserve such opprobrium.
Schurz’s men on the center and left of Howard’s line north of town stood fire
well and, for a while, effectively resisted Ewell’s assaults. In the end, how
ever, the XI Corps line north of town evaporated. The retreat of Howard’s XI
Corps rendered vulnerable the right flank of the I Corps line on Oak Ridge.
With victorious Confederates pushing into Gettysburg from the north, Rodes
io For a comprehensive perspective that sees beyond questions relating to ethnicity, see
A. Wilson Greene, "From Chancellorsville to Cemetery Hill: O. O. Howard and
Eleventh Corps Leadership," in Gallagher (ed.), First Day at Gettysburg, pp. 57-91.
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I

ched a second attafk fr°m ^a^
'[’le Union troops had little remain^^^Hiunition, and they finally received orders to abandon their posi-

^The center and left of the I Corps line continued to hold McPherson’s
west of town. Daniel’s North Carolinians, who had failed to support
found themselves embroiled in a tough fight against a newly arrived
de of Pennsylvanians under Colonel Roy Stone near the railroad cut and
. McPherson farm buildings. Few of the Pennsylvanians had seen serious
battle action before Gettysburg, but they faced north to repulse several
saiilts by Daniel’s Tar Heels and then redeployed under fire to face west
receive the attack by a fresh brigade from Heth’s division. To their
tnmediate south, the Iron Brigade continued to fight in the woodlot where
General Reynolds fell earlier that day. Their fight against Brigadier General
James Johnston Pettigrew’s North Carolinians on the afternoon of July 1
holds a prominent place in Gettysburg lore. Before it ended, the Iron
Brigade’s 24th Michigan alone lost eight officers killed and nearly 80 percent
of its men killed, wounded, and missing. One company of the 26th North
Carolina entered the fight with eighty-eight men in ranks and suffered
100 percent casualties. After about two hours of fighting, the survivors of
all the I Corps infantry brigades that fought that day on McPherson’s Ridge along with a massed battery of seventeen cannon astride the Chambersburg
Road - made a last stand on Seminary Ridge. At about 3:45 p.m., Lee sent
forward Major General W. Dorsey Pender's fresh division of Hill’s 3rd Corps
to carry the position. The Union defenders held on until Colonel
Abner M. Perrin's South Carolinians finally pierced the center of the Union
line near the Seminary’s Old Dorm.11
By about 4:00 p.m., the Union line north and west of Gettysburg had
collapsed, and Cemetery Hill south of town teemed with disorganized
survivors. Near the gatehouse of Evergreen Cemetery, Doubleday and
Howard clashed over troop deployments and command authority.
The arrival of Major General Winfield S. Hancock, commander of Meade’s
II Corps, ended further debate. Carrying with him Meade’s written author
ization to make decisions in his name - necessary, since both Howard and
Doubleday outranked him - Hancock ordered Howard to hold Cemetery
Hill and, over Doubleday's objections, sent one I Corps division to hold
adjacent Culp’s Hill. Slowly, order was restored.
ii J. Michael Miller, "Perrin’s Brigade on July i, 1863,” Gettysburg Magazine, no. 13 (July
1995): 22-32.
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About 5:00 p.m., observing the chaos on Cemetery Hill, Lee ordered
to attack Cemetery Hill “if practicable” and without renewing a pro]
fight. Ewell evaluated the situation, considered what he knew about ■
mostly what he did not know - and deemed Rodes’s and Early ’s division
disorganized to mount another attack. He decided against making the
Observers then and historians today still debate the correctness
decision.
°* his
Late on July 1, Lieutenant General Longstreet arrived at Lee’s head
ters near the seminary. After congratulating Lee on his success that d
Longstreet inquired about orders for his 1st Corps for the following mornin ’
He was surprised to learn that Lee intended to stay and fight at Gettysbur^
Longstreet later recalled that Lee had expressed a desire to launch an
offensive campaign but to fight defensive battles on ground he chose Now
he seemed to have abandoned that notion. When Lee asserted that if the
Union army remained at Gettysburg in the morning, he would attack,
Longstreet countered that if the Army of the Potomac still held its line
then Meade wanted Lee to attack. Lee stood his ground, however, and
Longstreet later recalled the exchange as one of the few times he ever saw
Lee “lose his vaunted equipoise.”12

12.4 July 2
As Lee settled in for the night, Major General Meade finally reached
Gettysburg about midnight. After speaking with several senior subordinates,
he ordered the entire Army of the Potomac to close on Gettysburg. He made
his first thorough reconnaissance of the battlefield at first light on July 2. After
considering - and quickly rejecting - an attack option, he designed
a defensive line that soon became known as “the fishhook.” The pointed
barb of the hook rested near Culp’s Hill, and Major General Henry
W. Slocum's XII Corps joined the I Corps troops sent there by Hancock to
defend it. The bend in the hook rested on Cemetery Hill, where Howard’s XI
Corps remained in place. The long shank of the fishhook extended south
from Cemetery Hill along a height known as Cemetery Ridge; Hancock’s II
Corps held the line immediately south of Cemetery Hill, and Major General
Daniel E. Sickles’s III Corps filled the southern extension of the ridge. Little
Round Top, its western slope recently deforested, stood just north of Big
12 James Longstreet, "Lee in Pennsylvania,” in The Annals of the War (Philadelphia:
Philadelphia Weekly, 1879), p. 434.
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I A ToP
tW°
anc'loring Meade's fishhook. When his V and VI
R°url arrived, Meade could use them to strengthen any part of his line or
CoT^m jn reserve. In Napoleonic terms, Meade had fashioned an inherho1^ strong interior line, about 4 miles long.
eI1^ July 2 dawned, however, Lee found himself in the unfamiliar position
his numerically inferior army on an exterior line that ultimately
ifed for 7 miles, beginning east of Culp’s Hill, continuing westward

^ugh Gettysburg, and then reaching south along Seminary Ridge. About
ile separated Seminary Ridge from the shank of the Union fishhook on
1 metery Ridge. Lee still planned to fight, and - because Stuart still remained
bsent-he ordered Captain Samuel Johnston, a staff engineer, to reconnoiter
. Union dispositions. Just where Johnston went and what he saw remain
one of Gettysburg’s great mysteries. In any case, he reported the presence of
Union troops on the hills just south of Gettysburg, noted more troops
extending partway down Cemetery Ridge, and claimed that the Round
Tops remained unoccupied.
Based onjohnston’s flawed report, Lee developed his battle plan for July 2.
He assigned the main effort to Longstreet’s 1st Corps, intending for them to
move south of Gettysburg and then attack northward along the Emmitsburg
Road toward the town to roll up the left flank of the Union line along
Cemetery Ridge and take Cemetery Hill in reverse. To coordinate with
Longstreet, Lee ordered Ewell to use his 2nd Corps to initiate a diversion with the option to turn it into a full-fledged attack - against Culp’s Hill and
Cemetery Hill. A. P. Hill’s 3rd Corps held Lee’s center, its mission to support
Longstreet and Ewell.13
Longstreet once again expressed strong opposition to Lee’s plan. When he
failed to change Lee’s mind, he reported that only the divisions of Major
General Lafayette McLaws and Lieutenant General John Bell Hood had
reached Gettysburg; Major General George Pickett’s division had not
arrived. Lee permitted Longstreet a brief delay for Hood’s final brigade to
arrive and made up for Pickett’s absence by giving Longstreet authority over
Lieutenant General Richard H. Anderson's division of Hill’s 3rd Corps. Still,
Longstreet did not begin to move into position until about 11:00 a.m. Lee had
expressed a desire that Longstreet move with both speed and secrecy, and
when McLaws reported that his route took them in view of a Union signal
station on Little Round Top, Longstreet ordered a countermarch that better
sheltered their march, delaying the attack further. About 3:30, when
13 OR, 27(2): 318.
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Longstreet’s troops finally reached the western slope of Seminary Ridge w
south of Gettysburg, he asked McLaws how he planned to deploy his ]ea(j
division for the attack. McLaws stated his intention to crest the ridge, march
eastward until astride the Emmitsburg Road, face his line to the north the
attack to roll up the left flank of the Union line. When the Confederate
reached the top of Seminary Ridge and saw their intended battleground
however, they immediately realized that it looked nothing like Captain
Johnston had described it. A large peach orchard and the open fields alon
the Emmitsburg Road, all reported as unoccupied, now teemed with Union
troops.
These soldiers belonged to Sickles’s III Corps. Meade had ordered Sickles
to hold the southern end of Cemetery Ridge and to cover Little Round Top
but Sickles quickly realized that if he pushed out to the peach orchard and the
Emmitsburg Road, he could deny Confederate batteries an advantageous
position. He had abandoned such a position at Chancellorsville, and
Confederate artillery rushed in and inflicted heavy losses on the III Corpshe did not want to repeat the experience. Twice Meade denied Sickles
permission to move forward, but finally, about 2:00 p.m., the III Corps
advanced without authority. Sickles placed one division along the
Emmitsburg Road facing west. To cover Little Round Top, he faced
his second division to the southwest, angling it back to fill the space between
the road and the hill. Sickles’s action disrupted Meade's fishhook and isolated
the III Corps from the rest of the Union army. Moreover, he had insufficient
manpower to hold the left of his line. He left wide gaps between his troops in
the peach orchard, those in the sizable Rose's Wheatfield, and those near the
massive rock formation now known as Devil’s Den. Sickles’s new line also
included an indefensible salient at the peach orchard that could be attacked
from west and south simultaneously.
Regardless of these weaknesses, Sickles’s advance rendered unworkable
Lee’s original orders to attack up the Emmitsburg Road and roll up the Union
flank. Although Longstreet informed Lee of the significant changes in the
military situation along this portion of the Union line since early morning,
Lee refused to alter his initial plan. To match the new reality, Longstreet now
deployed his troops to make a frontal assault against Sickles's entire line.
While McLaws's men remained in place to attack Union troops at the peach
orchard, where they initially had planned to deploy, Longstreet shifted Hood
to McLaws’s right flank to attack the left of the III Corps line closest to the
formidable Round Tops. Scouts reported a way around those hills that would
threaten the Union rear area and reduce the need for frontal attacks. But Lee
234
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own impatient, and Longstreet ordered Hood to attack. Hood - one of
, m0St aggressive subordinates - responded with the only formal protest
^his military career.
^hen Meade learned of Sickles s forward movement, he rode out toward
peach orchard, and, after a heated exchange with Sickles, ordered the III
Corps back to its original position, with an important codicil: “if General Lee
^11 jet yOu.” Just then, Longstreet’s artillery opened on Sickles’s line. Meade
■ mediately changed Sickles’s orders, instructing him to hold his line, rather
than risk a controlled withdrawal that might collapse under Confederate
ressure and destroy the entire Union line. Meade then informed Sickles that
he would support the III Corps line with reinforcements from quiet portions
of the fishhook. Rival interpretations of Sickles’s actions and Meade’s
response to them have fueled one of Gettysburg’s most heated controversies,
and vitriolic postwar exchanges between supporters of each general still
influence how historians evaluate this series of command decisions.
When Longstreet’s infantry assault began, Hood’s two leading brigades the Alabamians under Brigadier General Evander M. Law and the Texas
Brigade under Brigadier General Jerome B. Robertson - stepped off toward
their respective objectives, Little Round Top and the left of Sickles’s III Corps
line at Devil’s Den. Imperfectly understood orders, disruptive Union artillery
fire, and the effective work of the US Sharpshooters on the skirmish line
caused the two brigades to intermingle. Effective command and control
broke down, as three of Law’s and two of Robertson’s regiments headed
for Little Round Top, while two Alabama regiments and Robertson’s two
remaining units closed in on Devil’s Den. Hood fell wounded early in the
fight, leaving no senior commander to unsnarl the confusion.
On the crest of Little Round Top, an outstanding observation point, Major
General Gouvemeur K. Warren, the Army of the Potomac’s chief engineer,
spotted the gun barrels and bayonets of Longstreet’s men glinting in the late
afternoon sunlight. Even before the attack started, Warren realized that the
Confederate battle line extended well beyond the end of Sickles’s left flank on
Devil’s Den. Except for a signal team, Warren stood nearly alone. As a staff
officer, he had no authority to order combat troops to defend the hill, but
Colonel Strong Vincent, ordered to take his 1,400-man brigade from the
V Corps to reinforce the line in Rose’s Wheatfield, exercised his initiative
to divert to Little Round Top.
Vincent’s four regiments quickly formed a battle line on the southern slope
of Little Round Top, and their stand has become one of Gettysburg’s most
famous episodes. The Confederates first attacked Vincent’s right flank and
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then moved to hit his center. The stand of Colonel Joshua Lawren
Chamberlain’s 20th Maine on Vincent’s left flank and - at the time left flank of the entire Army of the Potomac, however, generally receiy
disproportionate attention. After several unsuccessful attempts by Law’
Alabamians to break Chamberlain’s line by frontal assault, the 15^
Alabama maneuvered around his left flank. The Maine colonel counted
only 386 men in ranks, but he managed to refuse his left flank to allow it t0
confront directly the new threat while the right half of his regiment
continued to face south. When ammunition ran low, Chamberlain ordered
his men to fix bayonets. As he reported it, he gave orders for the left of his line
to charge down the hill, swing to the right - like a gate - and clear their front
The exhausted Alabamians retreated in disorder when Chamberlain’s men
hit, and the threat to Little Round Top and the Union left flank evaporated
During the postwar years, Chamberlain and his soldiers seldom agreed on the
details of the fight - or who deserved the credit for the victory - but nobody
challenged the end result.
The same good fortune did not extend to Sickles’s advanced line.
At Devil’s Den, Confederate attackers received unexpected reinforce
ments. Brigadier General Henry L. Benning’s Georgia brigade should
have followed Law’s Alabamians to Little Round Top, but in the confu
sion of battle they entered the fight at Devil’s Den instead. The addition
of Benning’s firepower helped to bring the Devil’s Den fight to a quick
and victorious end for Southern arms. Sickles's overmatched Union
defenders finally withdrew to Cemetery Ridge. The most intense fighting
then shifted to John Rose’s nearby wheatfield, separated from Devil’s
Den by a small woodlot. For complexity and confusion, no aspect of the
Battle of Gettysburg defies analysis quite like the fight in the wheatfield.
For about ninety minutes, the rival forces attacked and counterattacked
through the trampled wheat and through the woods surrounding it. Like
a series of crashing waves, troops from four separate Confederate bri
gades were fed into the fight against soldiers from at least eleven Union
brigades. Nowhere did Meade fulfill his intention to support Sickles’s line
as completely as he did here; reinforcements from the II and V Corps
reinforced the original III Corps defenders in close combat that at time
flowed north and south and then east and west. Possession of the field
may have changed six times and no single individual commander exerted
control over it. In the end. Confederates held the western edge of the
field, Union soldiers held the woods to the east, and over 6,000 men had
fallen.
236

The Gettysburg Campaign

ongstreet’s attack then progressed toward Sickles’s line along the
tsburg Road. South Carolinians attacked the III Corps salient at the
^ch orchard from the south while Brigadier General William Barksdale’s
I*. issippians assaulted the position from the west. Union artillery broke the
q rolinians’ attack, but Barksdale’s Mississippians could not be stopped.
e collapse of the peach orchard salient now rendered vulnerable the left
flank of Sickles’s line along the Emmitsburg Road, and Longstreet now sent
forward Anderson’s division - the 3rd Corps troops assigned by Lee to
cooperate in Longstreet's main effort - to attack that line frontally. Lee’s
initial plan to outflank and roll up the Union line had apparently been
forgotten. As the III Corps readied to receive Anderson’s frontal attack,
heavy Confederate artillery fire - some of it coming from batteries just
arrived in the peach orchard as Sickles had feared - raked down their line
from the left. The III Corps line on the Emmitsburg Road began to give way.
In the chaos, a cannonball hit Sickles in the right leg, completely shattering it
and requiring amputation.
Although it is often unappreciated, the Union army now faced a crisis.
When Sickles moved forward from Cemetery Ridge, no other Union troops
had filled the gap he left. Only a few hundred yards behind Sickles’s original
line, nearly unprotected, lay the Taneytown Road, one of Meade's two lines
of supply, communication, and, if needed, retreat. A hastily organized line of
Union batteries bought time for Major General Hancock of the II Corps,
commanding the nearest unengaged troops, to cobble together a battle line
on south Cemetery Ridge to face Brigadier General Cadmus Wilcox’s
Alabamians and Colonel David Lang’s small brigade of Florida infantry
from Anderson’s division of A. P. Hill’s 3rd Corps. The sacrifice of the 1st
Minnesota infantry - often cited as an 82 percent loss - often claims the
spotlight, but other troops from the II Corps - and even regiments from the
Union I and XII Corps, the latter sent by Meade from the quiet Union right
flank on Culp’s Hill - helped to seal the breach here. After these troops
repulsed the charge of Anderson’s third brigade to enter the fight, Brigadier
General Ambrose Wright's Georgians - who some accounts claim reached
the crest of Cemetery Ridge itself - the sun set shortly after 7:00 p.m., finally
ending the Confederate main effort on July 2.
But quiet did not fall over the entire battlefield. Lee’s original orders
required Ewell to launch a diversion on the Confederate left flank at the
sound of Longstreet’s guns. At approximately 4:00 p.m., Ewell’s artillery on
Benner’s Hill had opened against Union batteries on Cemetery Hill and
Culp’s Hill. At twilight, after his guns fell silent - his batteries were entirely
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overmatched- Ewell ordered his infantry forward. He sent Major Geri I
Edward Johnson’s division against Culp’s Hill. They did not realize that 6 J

Meade had sent most of Slocum’s 10,000 soldiers to help Sickles
a brigade of 1,500 New Yorkers under Brigadier General George S Gre^
held the hill. Greene, an engineer, had his men erect breastworks and cl
a field of fire on the wooded slopes, giving him a decided advantage now th^

he faced at least 5,000 Confederate attackers. The sun fell as Johnson’
Confederates captured the lower half of Culp’s Hill. The upper half how
ever, remained securely in Union hands, since Colonel David Ireland’s 137th
New York- much like the 20th Maine on Little Round Top - refused its flank
on the right of Greene’s line and fought off Confederate attacks from two
directions. Ewell’s second assault targeted the northern and eastern slopes of
Cemetery Hill. Two brigades - the Louisianans of Brigadier General Harry
T. Hay and the Tar Heels of Colonel Isaac Avery - hit XI Corps brigades, still
badly mauled by their fight on July 1, broke their line, and even captured
Union cannon on the crest of the hill. But darkness and the timely arrival of
reinforcements from Hancock’s II Corps finally repulsed the attackers
The fighting on July 2, the battle’s costliest day, finally ended in darkness
While Antietam still ranks as the Civil War’s bloodiest day, July 2 at
Gettysburg remains a plausible candidate for the second position.

12.5 July 3
As comparative quiet fell over the battlefield, the rival commanders followed
far different courses. After only five days in command, two of them locked in
battle, Major General Meade needed to know the state of his army and the
state of mind of its key generals. He listened more than he talked at
a midnight gathering of his senior commanders. Major General Daniel
Butterfield, his chief of staff, then posed three questions. Should the army
stand at Gettysburg or withdraw? Should the Army of the Potomac take the
offensive or remain on the defensive? If the army stayed, but remained on the
defensive, how long should they await Lee’s next move? Their consensus stay, remain on the defensive, and reconsider options in twenty-four hours if
Lee took no action - fully suited Meade's own preferences.14 Lee held no such
14 Two interesting accounts of the so-called “council of war” can be found in Meade (ed.),
The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, vol. 11, p. 97; andjohn Gibbon, Recollections of
the Civil War (New York: Putnam’s, 1928), p. 187. As junior officer present, Gibbon cast
the first vote for each of the three questions so he could not be influenced by his
superior's preferences.
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ting with his senior commanders. He believed that July 2 had resulted in
01 • 1 victories on both flanks. Although his army had suffered significant
P
he remained convinced that continued attacks against those weakened
’°SS ts launched early in the morning, would bring decisive victory. As he
P° in his report, for July 3, “the general plan was unchanged.”15
Artillery fire opened early, but Lee's guns did not break the silence. Late
njuly 2> after suPPortinS Sickles, the XII Corps returned to Culp’s Hill and
found Ewell’s men occupying some of their breastworks. With Meade’s
rmission, Union batteries opened fire about 4:30 a.m. on Confederate
oops on lower Culp’s Hill and near Spangler’s Spring at its base,
-j-jre bombardment lasted only about fifteen minutes, but it prompted
Ewell to launch his early-morning attack. From 5:00 a.m. until nearly 11:00
a jn fierce fighting flared all along the line. At Spangler's Spring,
a misunderstanding of orders to gather intelligence on the location of the
Confederate line resulted in a needless frontal attack that resulted in the loss
of several hundred Union soldiers. Union fortunes fared far better on Culp’s
Hill itself, however, where Greene's original defenders, now heavily rein
forced by the rest of the XII Corps and others, took full advantage of the
protection their breastworks offered to throw back Ewell’s attack with heavy

loss.
About 9:00 a.m., the duration and intensity of the Culp’s Hill fight - and
Longstreet’s failure to match Ewell’s attack with his own offensive push
against the Union left - convinced Lee to reevaluate his options. Suspecting
that Meade had reinforced his flanks, Lee now considered an attack against
the Union center on Cemetery Ridge. Longstreet again respectfully dis
agreed, offering his professional opinion that “no 15,000 men” arrayed for
battle could break that line. Longstreet’s postwar detractors accused him of
insubordination for resisting Lee’s plan; in reality, he responsibly fulfilled his
obligation as the army’s second-in-command to critique and offer alternatives
to high-risk plans. In the end, Lee decided to assault the Union center on
Cemetery Ridge. His decision to do so still stands among the most contro
versial aspects of his generalship at Gettysburg.
Lee fleshed out his new plan with four additional decisions. First, he
designated the assault’s target, an area on Cemetery Ridge marked by
a conspicuous clump (or copse) of trees. Second, to neutralize the numerous
Union batteries, he took the unusual step of ordering a preliminary artillery
bombardment before the infantry assault. Third, he assigned the troops to
15 OR, 27(2): 320.
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make the attack, selecting Pickett’s 5,500-man Virginia division frnJ
Longstreet’s 1st Corps, the survivors of Heth’s division, and two bri
J
from Pender’s division, the latter two commands from Hill’s 3rd Qo^
While Pickett’s men were fresh, all of Hill’s units suffered heavily on I
Heth’s men went into action on July 3 under temporary command of Genera]
Pettigrew, and after Pender fell mortally wounded late on July 2 ]^aGeneral Isaac R. Trimble took command of his troops assigned to the char
In total, approximately 13,000 infantry formed the attacking force. Finally
Lee gave Longstreet command of the attack. Longstreet suggested that Le
give the assignment to an officer who possessed greater confidence in the
plan, but, after an awkward silence, he accepted his professional obligation to
"adopt his views and execute his orders as faithfully as if they were mv
J
own. »l6
At approximately 1:00 p.m., Confederate artillery opened. Estimates of the
bombardment’s duration range from ten minutes to four hours. Lee’s chief of
artillery, Brigadier General William N. Pendleton, failed to manage ammuni
tion resupply, and many Confederate shells overshot their marks. Still, Union
batteries near the copse of trees suffered significant damage, and
Confederates noticed that gun crews were removing damaged guns. Union
artillerymen needed twenty to thirty minutes to replace damaged batteries
with fresh ones. Could the Confederate infantry cross the valley between
Seminary and Cemetery Ridge - not quite a mile - in that time?16
17
Although Longstreet still opposed the charge - and even considered
stopping it when he learned of the low supply of artillery ammunition - he
finally nodded assent to Pickett’s request for orders to advance. Pickett’s
Virginians deployed in a deep swale near the Henry Spangler farm in the
valley between Seminary and Cemetery Ridges. Pettigrew’s and Trimble’s
men emerged from the trees on Seminary Ridge nearly one-quarter mile
north of Pickett’s men, pushing through the smoke of William Bliss’s burning
farm buildings. The terrain between Seminary and Cemetery Ridges gently
rolled, its hollows running north and south offering protection, especially to
Pickett’s Virginians, during their advance. Additionally, a ripple of ground
running west to east between the two ridges meant that Pickett’s division and
16 James Longstreet to A. B. Longstreet, July 24,1863, quoted in James Longstreet, "Lee in
Pennsylvania," p. 414.
17 See Gary W. Gallagher (ed.), Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of
General Edward Porter Alexander (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press,
1989), pp. 254-9; andjames Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs ofthe Civil
War in America (Philadelphia, PA: J. B. Lippincott, 1895), p. 392, for Confederate
perspectives on the effectiveness of the bombardment.
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>s and Trimble’s men advanced independently and out of sight of
Pe otjier until they neared the Emmitsburg Road that ran across their front
e3 ral hundred yards west of the Union center on Cemetery Ridge.
SC On Cemetery Ridge, Major General John Gibbon’s division of Hancock’s II
s deployed behind a stout stone wall that ran south to north in front of
^^opSe of trees. Pickett’s Virginians advanced toward Gibbon’s command.
he open area around the copse of trees became known as the Angle, since it
encompassed by the stone wall on two sides; just north of the trees, the
wall turned abruptly to the east and then after ioo yards, extended again to
jjie north. Brigadier General Alexander Hays’s division held the II Corps line
orth of the Angle, and Pettigrew's and Trimble’s troops mostly fought
against this command. The distinctions are important for understanding
the very different perspectives that participants bring to their accounts of
• Pickett’s Charge.”
Until the attacking Confederates reached the Emmitsburg Road, Union
artillery, including some fresh batteries, exacted the greatest cost.
Controversy arose when Brigadier General Henry J. Hunt, Meade’s chief of
artillery, wanted to fire deliberately to conserve ammunition for the final
Confederates push, while Major General Hancock insisted that his corps
batteries maintain a high rate of fire to steel his men. Hancock won the
argument on the field, but it continued for decades in print.18
By contrast, Union infantry held its fire until the Confederates came close
enough for effective massed volleys. When soldiers on Gibbon’s left opened
fire, they noticed Pickett’s troops shifting away from them and toward the
clump of trees, wrongly attributing the action to the accuracy of their fire.
Pickett's three brigades made this movement purposefully, however, with
their commanders leading from the front. Brigadier General Richard
B. Garnett, on horseback against orders, fell dead when his men halted
about 25 yards from the stone wall to fire their initial volley at Gibbon’s
defenders. Brigadier General James L. Kemper, deployed to Garnett’s right,
fell seriously wounded, his men rescuing him from near capture. Brigadier
General Lewis A. Armistead brought up Pickett’s second line and led across
the wall all the Virginians who would follow him. The Union line broke in
two places as Confederate infantry - as many as 1,500 or perhaps only
a handful - poured into the Angle. As the Union line stiffened and
18 See Francis A. Walker, "General Hancock and the Artillery at Gettysburg," in Robert
U. Johnson and Clarence C. Buel (eds.), Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 4 vols.
(New York: Century, 1884-9), vol. ill, pp. 385-6, andHenryJ. Hunt, “Rejoinder,” in ibid.,
hi, pp. 386-7, for opposing views.
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reinforcements arrived, Armistead fell mortally wounded. General Picj.
who had accompanied his division as far as the Emmitsburg Road Sent.ett’

reinforcements to exploit the breach, but none came. After an intense fight ■
the Angle that lasted perhaps twenty minutes, three Vermont regi^
threatened to envelop Pickett’s right flank. Pickett pulled his men ba
with a loss of approximately 60 percent of them. But “Pickett’s Cha ■■
was not a one-sided bloodletting. Some regiments in Gibbon’s division th
fought at the Angle suffered losses that exceeded 40 percent, and both
Hancock and Gibbon fell wounded.
Pettigrew’s and Trimble’s commands fared no better. They did not pene
trate the Union line where Hays’s division held it, although some Mississippi
troops later claimed they did. Indeed, according to Hays, the Confederate
attack was repulsed even more quickly than it took him to write about it. Still
as the fate of the nth Mississippi illustrates - its 592 men fought only on July 3
and lost 312 - Pettigrew’s men did not give way without a fight. Pettigrew and
Trimble both fell wounded. Colonel James K. Marshall - one of Pettigrew’s
brigade commanders - was killed, another wounded and captured, and
a third performed so poorly that he soon resigned. When Union troops
enveloped the left of their line, however, Pettigrew’s and Trimble’s survivors
withdrew as well. General Lee met them all back on Seminary Ridge and
accepted full responsibility for the attack.
The repulse of “Pickett’s Charge” ended the battle’s most intense infantry
fighting. Four miles to the east of Gettysburg, however, Stuart’s Confederate
cavalry - they had finally arrived at midday on July 2 - clashed with Union
horsemen under Brigadier General David M. Gregg. Rival skirmish lines of
dismounted troopers opened the fight. Stuart then ordered a mounted
charge, one of the largest sabre-to-sabre clashes of the entire war, that
newly promoted Brigadier General George A. Custer’s Michigan cavalry
finally blunted. After the war, suggestions arose that Stuart had orders to
attack the rear of Cemetery Ridge simultaneous with Pickett’s frontal assault,
but no contemporary evidence supports the notion. At the same time, south
of Gettysburg, Union troopers under newly promoted Brigadier General
Wesley Merritt advanced northward up the Emmitsburg Road to threaten
Lee’s left flank. A combined force of Confederate infantry and cavalry
stopped Merritt, but near the base of Big Round Top - an extension of
Merritt’s action along the road - Brigadier General Elon J. Farnsworth
suffered a similar reverse. Farnsworth received orders to advance over
rocky terrain that was not well suited to the operation of cavalry, leading
to a heated exchange between Farnsworth and his superior. Ultimately,
242

The Gettysburg Campaign

farnsW

rth personally led his men forward and fell mortally wounded.
between Stuart and Gregg, the cavalry fights on the southern

hery accomplished little. But they ended the battle.

12.6 The Retreat and Pursuit
n July 4, am’d sporadic skirmish fire, Major General Meade issued
congratulatory order to his army but canceled the traditional
* dependence Day salute to the nation lest the Confederates reopen the
battle Late in the day, in heavy thunderstorms, Lee pulled back his troops to
Seminary Ridge, abandoning Gettysburg and his line east of it. To withdraw
bis army, he started his combat troops and 5,000 Union prisoners on a direct
route for Hagerstown and then to the Potomac River crossings at
Williamsport, Maryland. He sent by a longer route toward Chambersburg
and then south to Williamsport his 17-mile-long wagon train of sick and
wounded soldiers, all he could transport, while leaving thousands to be cared
for by Northern military and civilian medical personnel.
Meade's cavalry followed Lee closely, but the Union infantry did not
follow until July 5. Heavy rain that slowed Meade’s pursuit also destroyed
the pontoons Lee was relying upon to remove his army safely across the
Potomac. Thus, Meade caught up with Lee at Williamsport. Meade prepared
to attack on July 13, but bad weather once again forced a delay. When the
skies cleared on July 14, Lee’s army had crossed on rebuilt bridges.
A frustrated Abraham Lincoln wrote Meade a letter bemoaning Lee’s escape,
but he never sent it; instead, he publicly congratulated Meade and his army
on their victory. Meade’s inability to mount an aggressive pursuit of Lee after
Gettysburg still colors evaluations of his generalship.
According to official records, the Army of the Potomac lost 3,155 killed,
14,529 wounded, and 5,365 captured and missing at Gettysburg. Lee's Army of
Northern Virginia lost 2,592 killed, 12,709 wounded, and 5,150 captured and
missing. The raw numbers considerably understate the battle’s impact on the
two forces, however. Approximately 5,000 of the wounded died of their
injuries; Gettysburg's final death toll exceeds 10,000. Reynolds’s death, the
wounding of Hancock and Sickles, as well as the loss of over a dozen brigade
and division commanders shattered Meade’s senior leadership. Lee lost no
corps commanders, but he soon missed their fallen subordinates; he espe
cially lamented the loss of irreplaceable regimental and company comman
ders. The two armies sparred at Bristoe Station and Mine Run later in 1863,
but major active operations did not resume until the start of the Overland
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campaign in May 1864, when Lee once again took on Meade, now cnn
ably overshadowed by the arrival of Lieutenant General Ulysses S Grant
The battle’s impact touched far more than the rival combatants. Hundr
of Pennsylvanians incurred uncompensated damage to property and liveb
hood. Gettysburg’s 2,400 residents struggled to provide for well over ->a
wounded soldiers until army surgeons organized a system to care for them
Within a few days, both curious gawkers and grieving families arrived th
latter to retrieve the remains of loved ones - if they could be found. Trench
graves crisscrossed trampled farm fields. Huge clouds of greasy black smoke
from burning over 5,000 dead horses and mules created a stench that only
peppermint oil or camphor could block. Teenagers made money by collect
ing battlefield artifacts; several local children died when live artillery rounds
exploded in their hands. Pennsylvania governor Andrew Curtin authorized
local attorney David Wills to purchase land for a military cemetery, and Wills
secured 17 acres on Cemetery Hill for that purpose. In time, Wills invited
Edward Everett, the premier orator of his time, to deliver the dedicatory
address and invited President Lincoln to add "a few appropriate remarks.”
On November 19,1863, to an audience of perhaps 15,000, Lincoln delivered his
brief, but decidedly eloquent, Gettysburg Address.
In time Gettysburg played a central role in inspiring a spirit of national
reunion after the Civil War. John B. Bachelder, a wartime militia officer
who became the first “official” historian of the battle, turned Gettysburg
into a literary and interpretive battleground, one where the objectivity of
history and the subjectivity of national memory freely intertwine even
today. He invited veterans from both armies to return to Gettysburg, and
his interviews with them helped him to approve locations for many of the
monuments that still stand on the battlefield’s woodlots, hillsides, and farm
fields. But he was also a hotel owner and entrepreneur who promoted an
image of Gettysburg as the “high water mark” of the Confederacy and the
turning point of the war to attract visitors. Although Meade’s victory at
Gettysburg, both alone and when combined with Union success at
Vicksburg on July 4, provided a welcome outpouring of excitement - one
Philadelphia newspaper emblazoned “Waterloo Eclipsed” as a headline
above its Gettysburg coverage - it did not last long.19 News of the
New York draft riots, the failure at Fort Wagner in mid-July, the inactivity
in the eastern theater in the fall of 1863, and the Union defeat at
Chickamauga in September soon quieted the short-lived euphoria of July.
19 Philadelphia Enquirer, July 6, 1863.
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jjltirnately, the results of the Battle of Gettysburg did not change the
strategic picture dramatically for either side. Lee did not surrender until
twenty-one months later, and historians argue that Antietam, Vicksburg,
Atlanta, the 1864 elections, among others, had more lasting impact. But
popular memory still places Gettysburg above them all.
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